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Abstract 
Pricing strategies may include the advertising of meeting-the-competition clauses (MCCs). We show in a specific 
spatial model scenario with differently informed consumers that MCCs primarily serve as a device to facilitate 
collusion instead of allowing for price discrimination between these consumers.
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1.  Introduction 
 
An often observed firm strategy is the combination of price announcements with so-called 
meeting-the-competition  clauses  (MCCs),  which  guarantee  every  consumer  to  buy  a 
respective  product  at  the  lowest  known  price  (Levy  and  Gerlowski  1991,  and  Png  and 
Hirshleifer 1987). It is generally accepted that MCCs serve to facilitate collusion (due to the 
instantaneous  sanctioning  of  price-cut  deviations)  and  allow  firms  to  price-discriminate 
between differently informed consumer groups.
1 
However, we challenge the emergence of price discrimination in a specific model scenario 
that somewhat follows the scenario of Levy and Gerlowski (1991). The respective markets 
are characterized by firms setting one price for its product, respectively, and deciding over 
the implementation of a MCC. Both together, i.e. the decision over the price and the decision 
to offer a MCC, constitute a firm’s strategy. This strategy is advertised to the consumers, 
which can be divided into two groups. One group is informed of the prices of every firm in 
the respective market (informed consumers), while the other group knows only the price of 
one of the two competitors (uninformed consumers).
2 
In  such  a  scenario,  price  discrimination  between  differently  informed  consumers  cannot 
generally be uphold and the combined offering of MCCs and advertising may primarily serve 
as a device to facilitate collusion. 
 
2.  The Effect of Advertised MCCs on the Rationale to Price-discriminate 
 
According to Levy and Gerlowski (1991, pp. 217-219) firms are assumed to be located at 
endpoints of a ‘linear city’, which is the unit line for simplicity. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed with density one. Given that the delivered price is less than their reservation price 
v, each consumer buys one unit of the product. Consumers incur transportation costs t per 
unit of distance x, whereas    0   x  1. Each firm sets a non-discriminatory (uniform) price p. 
Thus, the effective delivered price of each firm i is  pi + txi. Firms do not incur fixed costs but 
constant per unit variable costs of c. Now, consumers rely on advertising to determine the 
location and prices of firms. A firm’s advertising messages are randomly dispersed with   i , 
   0   i  1, as the fixed probability that any consumer receives a firm i’s advertising message, 
which is independent of location. Advertising costs are denoted by 
 
A  i ( ). 
The analysis focuses on only two firms (   i =1,2) because the results are qualitatively upheld 
if more than two firms are considered. Characterizing consumers as differently informed 
refers to how many messages they receive. Therefore, consumers are ‘informed’, respectively 
‘uninformed’, if they receive messages from both firms, respectively a message from only 
one firm. Consumers then purchase from the firm with the lowest delivered price of those 
firms whose advertising message they have received or they do not purchase elsewhere if no 
advertising message is received. Thus, profits of firm one are given by: 
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1  See,  e.g.,  Salop  (1986),  Belton  (1987),  Png  and  Hirshleifer  (1987),  Logan  and  Lutter  (1989),  Levy  and 
Gerlowski (1991), Moorthy and Winter (2006). 
2 Indeed, not knowing any price is possible, but neither the existence of such consumers nor their respective 
share under all consumers affects the analysis. 
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with a) being the quantity demanded of the consumers which firm 1 reaches alone, b) being 
the  quantity  demanded  of  those  consumers  receiving  messages  from  both  firms,  and 
   
p2   p1 + t ( )/ 2t denoting firm 1’s demand under full information (Tirole 2003, pp. 292-
293).
3  According  to  the  first-order  condition  with  respect  to  firm  1’s  price, 
   
ˆ p1 = p2 + t + c ( ) 2+ t 1  2 ( )  2 ,  the  resulting  price  in  the  case  of  symmetric  firms 
(   ˆ p1 = ˆ p2 = ˆ p, and   1 =  2 =   ) amounts to: 
 
 
   
ˆ p = t + c ( )+ 2t 1   ( )   = c + t 2   ( )   .  (2) 
 
If  concerned  only  about  the  profits  from  informed  consumers, 
   
 1 2 p2   p1 + t ( ) 2t         p1   c ( )  A  1 ( ), the first-order condition yields 
     
  p1 = p2 + t + c ( ) 2 as 
the competitive price, which amounts to 
 
         p = c + t < ˆ p   (3) 
 
in symmetric equilibrium (full-information equilibrium).
4 
The monopoly price,  pM , is given by the maximum possible price (according to consumers 
with the highest distance of 1), i.e. the effective delivered price is smaller than the reservation 
price v to cover the whole market (Tirole 2003, p. 279): 
 
   pM = v   t .  (4) 
 
Thus,      p and  pM  serve as the lower and upper bound, respectively, of possible prices (under 
the assumption of symmetric firms). 
Now, each firm’s advertised message contains the chosen uniform price and the decision to 
offer a MCC, i.e. guaranteeing the informed consumers to purchase from the nearest firm at 
the  lowest  delivered  price.  Because  the  central  question  of  this  analysis  concerns  the 
possibility of firms to price-discriminate between consumer groups by offering a MCC,
5 we 
examine two different cases: first, both firms offer a MCC, and secondly, only one of the two 
firms offers to match the other’s price. What are the respective prices set in equilibrium? 
The central characteristic of this model is that each firm gets half of the demand of the 
informed  consumers  if  prices  of  both  firms  are  equal.  This  is  due  to  the  ‘indifferent 
consumer’ who then is located at    x =
1
2 , which follows out of the demand functions for firm 1 
and  firm  2, 
   
D1 p1, p2 ( ) = x = p2   p1 + t ( ) 2t   and 
   
D2 p1, p2 ( ) =1  x = p1   p2 + t ( ) 2t, 
respectively.  The  introduction  of  a  MCC  by  both  firms  results  in  price  equality  for  the 
informed  consumers,  no  matter  which  price  is  set.
6  No firm  can  increase  its  demand  by 
lowering  its  price  because  this  activates  the  other  firm’s  MCC.  If  both  firms  behave 
rationally, the mutual MCC plays the role of an institution that solves the otherwise existing 
prisoners  dilemma  (PD).  Without  the  mutual  MCC  it  would  be  tempting  to  deviate 
                                                        
3 By interchanging the indices, we get the profits of firm 2. 
4 The inequality in (3) holds as long as  1   < . 
5 Compared to Png and Hirshleifer (1987), who disregard advertising and spatial competition, offering a MCC 
now is no (weakly) dominant strategy. 
6 Uninformed consumers are not affected by a MCC. Their demand only reacts on changes in the advertising 
strategies (i.e. the probability of receiving at least one firm’s message). 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(downwards) from the prevailing price in order to lure consumers away from the competitor. 
This represents the competitive mechanisms that drive prices down to marginal costs – in the 
absence  of  mutual  MCCs!  However,  the  existence  of  mutual  MCC  allows  both  firms  to 
maximize per-unit profits by setting the highest possible price, i.e. the monopoly price  pM . 
The mutual MCC erodes any incentive to deviate from that equilibrium since no gains can be 
reaped. Every hypothetical other price  pi   pM  of firm i would result in lower total profits. 
As a  consequence, in equilibrium, no firm is able to price-discriminate between the two 
consumer  groups  and  both  the  uninformed  as  well  as  the  informed  consumers  pay  the 
monopoly price  p
M .
7 
Even in the case in which only one of the two firms, say firm 1, adopts a MCC and the other 
does  not,  no  price-discrimination  between  informed  and  uninformed  consumers  can  be 
installed. In this scenario, firm 2 has no incentive to undercut firm 1’s price as it cannot 
attract additional consumers (due to firm 1’s MCC). However, firm 2 can rationally expect 
firm 1 to be a ‘soft’ competitor. Firm 1 cannot lose by setting its price equal to  pM  (due to 
the activation of its MCC if    p2 < p1). Therefore, it has little incentive to undercut firm 2’s 
price and enter into price competition (every realized price below  pM  results in lower total 
profits). Thus, for every price    p2 < pM , firm 2 can secure higher profits by setting  pM . In 
other words, once in a collusive equilibrium, neither party experiences more than rather weak 
incentives to deviate from the monopoly price. Consequently, even a unilateral MCC might 
with some plausibility suffice to overcome the PD game of price competition and stabilize a 
collusive and non-discriminating equilibrium. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
In the analysed specific type of model with firms advertising their prices and MCCs, the 
latter serve only as a practice to facilitate collusion and not as a device to price-discriminate 
between informed and uninformed consumers. Moreover, there is a trade off between the 
MCC’s function as a collusion facilitating device (solving the PD game) and its function as a 
price discriminating device: a perfect collusion facilitating function erodes the scope for price 
discrimination. Note, however, that MCCs are assumed to work perfectly in these models, i.e. 
transaction costs, imperfectly rational consumers, etc. are not considered. 
                                                        
7  Although,  Moorthy  and  Winter  (2006,  pp.  450-456)  model  the  information  of  uninformed  consumers 
differently (namely, uninformed consumers do not observe any price but the offering of a MCC), setting the 
monopoly price is a strictly dominant strategy for both firms also for their scenario. 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